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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PRIVATE UNIVERSITY
GOVERNANCE: A LOOK FROM THE LAW SCHOOLS
ROBERT T. BROUSSEAU*

Law schools belong in the modern university no more than a school
of fencing or dancing.
Thorstein Veblen**
One can have a great university without a law school, because it
has been done, but it must be much more difficult.
Edward H. Levi***
INTRODUCTON

It does no good to hide one's convictions and later pass them off as
inexorable conclusions deduced from unquestionable premises. One need
not be ashamed of having opinions rather than some mental tabula rasa.
It is jumping to conclusions, not expounding them, that is frowned upon.
In the search for a labor policy in the university world we have been looking
for facts to fit our theories rather than theories to fit our facts, a common
enough failing among scholars and police detectives. Having only one theory Imodel" is a better term - in the New Deal labor legislation, we have a
natural tendency to force it where it does not belong. The legislation has
excluded supervisors for forty years. We no longer question whether it
makes sense in all conceivable employment circumstances to exclude supervisors. We assume they must go. Similarly, since professionals receive special
treatment under these industrial statutes, we now give special treatment to
professional educators, especially lawyers. We do not tarry to think that although a lawyer has little in common with a chemist, a law professor has
remarkably close allegiance to a chemistry professor, even though neither
may realize it.
Our legal perceptions often are skewed by our perspective. We law professors assert our distinctiveness, our individuality in the university world.
This same assertion occasionally is propounded by outsiders to the law school
world, depending on who is trying to make what point. In seeking to justify
its traditionally higher salary scale or more rapid promotion and tenure
schedule, a law faculty asserts its uniqueness. But as against the frequent
suggestions that its function is vocational rather than scholarly education, the
*Jervey Fellow in Foreign Law, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law,
Columbia University, and Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University. B.S.F.S., 1969,
Georgetown University; J.D., 1972, Duke University. The author has found the comments
of William Young of the Columbia law faculty most helpful in the preparation of the
final draft of this article.
**T. VEBLEN, THE HIGERa LEARNING IN AMERIcA 211 (1918).
***Levi, Law Schools and the Universities, 17 J. LEGAL EDuc. 243, 245 (1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXlX

law professoriate vociferously swears its kinship beyond death with the general
academic fraternity. Law's coming and going from the university table and
its spotted pedigree in that ancient academic family are relatively complex
phenomena that nonetheless are at the center of some of the difficulties to
be encountered. Even at Columbia, where in universal terms law is a relative
latecomer, its name is graven with only Philosophy, Theology, and Medicine
as one of the four classical disciplines' on the neoclassical columns supporting the Low Rotunda.
This as yet ill-defined place of the professional school in the academic
community makes difficult questions more difficult. This is so because labor
relations, born on the assembly lines and in the mills, is more conscious than
most areas of the general discipline of what is called "industrial reality" - a
sanguine leaning away from the doctrinal and syllogistic application of known
rules to unknown facts toward a more flexible formulation of variegated
rules for varying employment conditions. In this area of the law, Procrustes
must remake his bed from traveller to traveller. We should look at the actual
role of the law faculty in the university and not be bound by doctrinal
niceties, preexisting or inchoate. Arthur Larson has said that the glory of
the law lies not in resolving questions of degree but in discovering categories
of legal relations - in drawing boxes and not lines. We are having trouble
drawing boxes, and have limned one around the law school and another
around the rest. These are false categories. The legally cognizable distinction
should be made between professor and nonprofessor, not lawyer and nonlawyer.
THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY, THE WAGNER ACT,
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

The Tradition of "Self-Governance"
in Universitiesand Law Faculties
The Concept of Shared Authority. I have written "self-governance" between quotation marks as one often does with foreign terms. The term implies

an amplification of the traditional academic notion of shared authority,
that is, shared authority raised to a higher power. Sometimes the ideal
occurs wrapped in the adjuration that a law school should be "autonomous,"
whatever that means. 2 Thus, a law faculty's claim for special treatment under
the labor laws arises on two planes: it builds upon the claims of his nonlegal
1. "At the beginning of the twentieth century the term 'university' in American higher
education was considered to include four faculties: the liberal arts, law, medicine (including
dentistry), and theology." White, The Law School and the University Administration: A
Continuing Dialogue, 1969 TOL. L. REV. 395, 398. White quoted A. HENDERSON, POLICIES
AND PRACTICES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 61 (1960), which noted that in 1900, 52% of college

graduates entered professions of law, medicine, dentistry, and the ministry. Id.
2. The phrase, used more specifically with reference to law libraries, is Levi's. Levi,
Law Schools and the Universities, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 247 (1965). Although Levi used
it quizically for humorous effect, he built upon this and other hoary traditions of legal
education and dared to question whether they are justified in the second half of the
twentieth century. See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
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colleagues. First, there is an assertion that university faculty status alone
confers special privileges, and second, the suggestion that membership in
lawyerdom requires further accommodation.
It is generally agreed 3 that the faculty's role is characterized by the model
of shared authority most authoritatively put in the Statement on the Government of Colleges and Universities,4 drafted jointly by the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education, and the
Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, "the three
largest national organizations essentially representing college and university
faculty members, administrators, and trustees." 5 The Statement provides for
significant participation by members of the faculty. "on general educational
policy, long range planning, allocation of physical resources, budgeting and
the selection of key administrative officers." 6 Primary responsibility lies with
the faculty in such traditional areas of teacher concern as curriculum, subject
matter, methods of instruction, research, and student life insofar as it affects
the educational process.7 On questions of faculty status the faculty must
exercise primary authority:
The primary responsibility of the faculty for such matters is based upon
the fact that its judgment is central to general educational policy.
Furthermore, scholars in a particular field or activity have the chief
competence for judging the work of their colleagues; in such competence it is implicit that responsibility exists for both adverse and
favorable judgments. Likewise there is the more general competence
of experienced faculty personnel committees having a broader charge.
Determination in these matters should first be by faculty action through
established procedures, reviewed by the chief academic officers with
the concurrence of the board. The governing board and president
should, on questions of faculty status, as in other matters where the
faculty has primary responsibility, concur with the faculty judgment
except in rare instances and for compelling reasons which should be
stated in detail.8
Although highly regarded in the general academic community and trilaterally endorsed by the drafting organizations, the Statement remains with
a few exceptions 9 an unenforceable ideal cloaking a spectrum of systems
from presidential autocracies to collegial and diffuse ochlocracies. In the
domain of legal education, however, the, principles of shared authority have
been written into the published standards of accreditation for law schools.
Thus the American Bar Association has provided:
3. See Finkin, Collective Bargainingand University Government, 1971 Wis. L. Rxv. 125,
125-27; Gee, Organizing the Halls of Ivy: Developing a Framework for Viable Alternatives
in Higher Education Employment, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 233, 241 n.57.
4. The statement is reproduced in ACADEMIC FREED)OM AND TENURE (L. Joughin ed.
1969) and in

AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION OF UNIvERsrrY PROFESSORS,

POLICY DOCUMENTS

AND

REPORTS OF THE AAUP (1969).
5. Finkin, supra note 3, at 125.

6. Id. at 126.
7.
8.

Id.
Id. (quoting STATEMENT ON THE GovERNMENT OF COLLGES AND UNrvRrrmS
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The governing Board [of the law school or the university of which
it is a part] may establish general policies for the law school, provided
they are consistent with a sound educational program and [these]
Standards.
Within those general policies, the dean and faculty of the law school
shall have the responsibility for formulating and administering the program of the school, including such matters as faculty selection, retention, promotion and tenure; curriculum; methods of instruction; admission policies; and academic standards for retention, advancement,
and graduation of students.
The dean and faculty of the law school shall have the opportunity to
present their recommendations on budgetary matters before the budget
for the law school is submitted to the Governing Board.
The allocation of authority between the dean and the faculty is a
matter for determination by each institution.
The law school may involve a Committee of Visitors or current
students, or both, in a participatory or advisory capacity. The dean
and faculty shall retain control over matters that are entrusted to
them under [these] Standards.-0
The Association of American Law School, the organization representing
the legal academies, carries such prestige that it is able to exact conditions
for admission to membership which are for the most part significantly more
stringent than the standards for approval of the American Bar Association.
Thus the AALS bylaws provide in article 6-1.4 that "each member school
shall maintain . . . [a] faculty of high competence and suitable size, vested

with primary responsibility for determining institutional policies," ' a skeletal
directive given flesh by the more specific statement of "approved association
policy":
c. Faculty government. Determination of institutional policies by
the law faculty presupposes a properly constituted and organized
faculty, meeting regularly according to orderly procedures, with records
of its deliberations.
As to personnel matters, experience in the law school world has
shown that a competent faculty is best assured by the faculty's exercising a substantial degree of control over decanal and faculty appointments or changes in faculty status (such as promotions, tenure desig9. In May, 1969, at the urging of the St. John's chapter of the AAUP, the board of
St. John's University formally adopted the AAUP Statement on the Government of Colleges

and Universities. Hueppe, Private University: St. John's, a case study in E. DURYEA & R.
FISK, FACULTY

UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

175, 177 (1973). St. John's also gained

the distinction of being, in 1966, the first institution at which members of the AAUP were
counseled to refuse appointments. Id. at 177.

10. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE, Standards 204-208 (1973). Standard 604(i) - (iii) in the same vein prescribes
that: "(i) the dean, law librarian, and faculty of the law school shall be responsible for
determining library policy, including the selection of acquisitions, arrangements of materials
and reader services. The allocation of authority among the dean, law librarian and faculty
is a matter for determination by each institution; (ii) the budget for the law library

shall be determined as part of, and administered in the same manner as, the law school
budget; (iii) the selection and retention of the law librarian shall be by the dean and
faculty of the law school."
11. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS BY-LAws, art. 6-1.4 (Jan. 1976).
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nations, and renewal or termination of term appointments). The
capacity to make the pertinent decisions is maintained by procedures
under which
i. The faculty (acting as a whole or by a representative portion
determined by reasonable criteria), assembled in a meeting of
which suitable notice has been given, makes the initial choice
with respect to faculty appointments or changes in faculty
status, for submission through any intermediate approving
authorities to the final appointing authority;
ii. The faculty, individually or collectively, is consulted with
respect to appointment of the dean before submission of any
official recommendation to the final appointing authority, or
when no such official recommendation is contemplated, before
action by the final appointing authority;
iii. Except in rare cases and for compelling reasons, no decanal or
faculty appointment or change in faculty status will be made
over the expressed opposition of the faculty (acting as a whole
or by a2 representative portion determined by reasonable
criteria). 2
A further Association bylaw requires as a prerequisite to membership "[i]nstitutional relationships that give appropriate range to the law faculty's judgment concerning the law school's opportunities and needs,"' 3 a rule again
4
given detail by specifically approved policies.
What in these self-legislated provisions warrants such a large place in a
discussion of labor relations? It is that these paragraphs and the larger body
of university and law school custom which they reflect portray a fundamentally nonhierarchical system of governance largely irreconcilable with the
pyramidal power structure out of which the law of labor relations developed.
There is no single locus of authority comparable to the ubiquitous plant
manager in blue-collar labor relations. Although juridically speaking, the
board of trustees is the ultimate arbiter on all questions, picayunish or momentous, monetary or scholarly, it is so only in the peculiar eyes of certain
branches of the law. In reality - and it is with the reality of the workingplace that labor law proclaims its concern - the board of trustees delegates
virtually all its technical authority into such a diffuse network of overlapping jurisdictions (chancellors, provosts, vice-presidents, deans, senates,
boards, chairmen, faculties, students) that it is difficult or impossible to say
who "controls" whom. A system of law, paradigmatically the New Deal Wagner
Act and its progeny,15 conceived in hierarchical, polarized ("we-they"), and
12.

Id.

13. Id. art. 6-1.5.
14. The policy statement reads: "A member school (acting in accord with faculty
judgment) should have wide discretion, compatibly [sic] with its university's overall
interests, to a. Identify its goals conformably with the purpose of this association; b.
Formulate its program to achieve those goals; c. Determine the financial support needed

to operate its program; d. Present its proposals to the principal administrative officer
of the university of which it is a part; e. Seek assistance from and counsel of such
non-university groups and individuals as in its judgment may be helpful in formulating or
fostering the achievement of its program; and f. Raise funds outside of general uni-

versity funds." Id.
15.

National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61
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adversarial terms, will not easily be translated to an educational system
grounded in principles of shared authority.
The question soon surfaces: if the extant laws of labor relations so ill
fit the university faculty, why does the professoriate organize, form these
associations for the purposes of collective bargaining? If we can detect no
essential difference between the motivation of the collegiate educator and his
blue-collar brother, we may be unjustified in calling for distinctive treatment of the two.
Why the Professoriate Organizes. In retrospect it is easy to see that industrial unionization resulted from the breakdown of the intimate masterservant relation of the medieval period. It is not the wont of modern
Western man to submerge his individuality into a collectivity unless he perceives that as an individual he is unable to be heard and to secure to some
appreciable degree that for which he works. If the individual stance holds
out greater hope, it is taken; if it appears futile, only then is it rejected.
Kahn-Freund has explored the implications of this phenomenon in several
of his works. 6 Organization, seen from the worker's end, is never simply
desirable, it is necessary.
In the academic employment context the same is true, but with differences
that may prove to be fundamental rather than of mere detail. The first distinction is in the nature of the demand made. It is generally assumed that
the ordinary worker organizes for economic purposes while the professor
collectivizes for more altruistic reasons. This distinction wholly misses the
point and masks meaningful differences with indefensible ones. Whether a
demand is economic is a matter of judgment. Many blue-collar demands have
little value in the worker's pay envelope, and a curricular matter such as
teaching load may not unfairly be viewed as an economic matter to affected
teachers.
What distinguishes the professor from his blue-collar colleague on the
university staff is the relation of the employee to the purpose of the employer.
Only rarely is an ordinary employee much concerned with the product or
the consumer. To him these are the remote other side of the production
mirror. When he looks at working conditions, everything is reflected in terms
of himself. The professor, on the other hand, has always concerned himself
intimately with the "product" and has always enjoyed a central role not
merely in its execution, but in the broadest exercise of powers of design and
policy formulation - and of course with the "consumer" or student. What
other rank-and-file employee has the range of discretion in the affairs of the
business and can decide -who shall consume its services and who in fact
shall be his supervisors, his colleagues, or his lackeys? The college professor
is most likely to organize when these intangible perquisites are reduced,
whereas the ordinary employee wages battle over more tangible benefits.

Stat. 136 (1947), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 88 Stat. 395
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. -§§151-169 (Supp. 1975)).
16. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW (1972). 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR LAW:
OLD TRADMONS

AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

(1968).
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The nature of the institution from the employee's perspective must also
affect the reasonableness of lumping educational institutions with gardenvariety industrial establishments. It is neither logical nor fair to treat disparately the janitor for the Shawmut Bank and the janitor for Harvard
College. As to each employee the nature of the institutions is the same, whether
for other purposes the institutions are commercial or nonprofit. There appears
small reason to deprive the one of whatever benefits organization may give
him solely because his employer is a charitable educational body. From the
faculty member's perspective, on the other hand, the institution is no common
employer. The professor finds no meaningful analogue in the commercial
sector. His primary concern is thus generally not commercial or, speaking
reductively, economic, but rather the conduct of the enterprise in a manner
compatible with his own beliefs and desires. It is when the faculty member
perceives himself unable as an individual significantly to influence his institution that he seeks the unorthodox solution of organization. Rather than seeking benefit X or Y, in which the dualistic and hierarchical "we-they" patterns
of industrial labor law are appropriate, the organizational struggle of the
faculty is primarily a struggle for control in whatever specific proposals it is
momentarily camouflaged. One writer has noted the awkwardness of describing faculty organization in industrial terms.
[I]t is appropriate to make an attempt to resolve the apparent conflict between the . . . observation that professors organize to protect
the shared authority system from incursions by the trustees, students, and
administrators and [the] conclusion that the reason why the [National
Labor Relations Act] is inappropriate for universities is the existence
of the shared authority government system. The explanation is that
organization to protect shared authority is unlike organizing for
economic gains and involves an attempt to preserve the faculty's prerogatives in actually running the institution. The process is analogous
to a proxy fight for voting control of a corporation. The NLRA was
and thus it is not able
never meant to govern this sort of organizing
1
satisfactorily to resolve the problems. 7
The comparison with a proxy fight, although imperfect, is apt. The struggle
to be heard that is undertaken by the faculty begins from a position of preexisting collegiality. In a sense the faculty member, as the shareholder to
whom he has been analogized, is already collectivized and has a collective
voice in committee, in the faculty of his college or department, or in the
university senate. The industrial employee's starting point, on the other
hand, is the naked individual. Axioms applicable to the merging of individual
power into collective power are not lightly transferable to the transformation of one sort of collective power into another. Square pegs can only
be forced into round holes, and resulting damage is necessarily mutual.18

17.

Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through

Adjudication, 21 UC.L.A: L. Rxv.. 63,'103. n.142 (1973).
18. The metaphor assumes a peg whose diagonal exceeds the diameter of the aperture..
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The University and the Board's
JurisdictionTo Regulate
"Employer" is a term of art in labor law. The National Labor Relations
Act until recently defined "employer" as follows:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net
earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ....

19

With the exception of the nonprofit hospital exemption and the exclusion
of governmental employers nothing in the quoted language suggests that
an institution of higher learning is not an employer in the ordinary sense
envisioned by the statute. Indeed, both the breadth of the language of the
enactment ("any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly") and the specificity of its exceptions argue against carving out a
special area for nonprofit schools. Nonetheless, the National Labor Relations
Board in its celebrated decision in Trustees of Columbia University2° did
just that in creating the so-called good works exclusion.21 The Board, although finding that the University met both the "affecting commerce" requirements of the Act 22 and the more stringent standards adopted by the
Board to regulate its discretionary jurisdiction, 23 relied on the Conference
Report on the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act:
[N]onprofit organizations excluded under the House bill are not
specifically excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in connection with purely commercial activities
of such organizations have any of the activities of such organizations
or of their employees been considered as affecting commerce so as to
24
bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board's position in refusing to assert jurisdiction over nonprofit
organizations is difficult to reconcile with the Act, the Conference Report, or
19. National Labor Relations Act §2(2), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by Pub. L. No.
101, §2(2), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), Pub. L. No. 86-257, §3(e), 73 Stat. 520 (1959) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1970)).
20. 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951), overruled, Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
21. The rise and fall of the good works exclusion is well noted in Note, NLRB Jurisdiction over Private Colleges and Universities- Toward Elimination of the Good Works
Exclusion, 44 TEMP. L. Q. 410 (1971).
22. 97 N.L.R.B. at 425 & n.2.
23. Id. The use of these jurisdictional standards, not provided for in the 1935 and
1947 redactions of the NLRA, was sanctioned by the 1959 Landrum-Griflin amendments in
a new section 14(c)(1) added to the Act. Note that the Board can extend but not decrease
the sweep of its jurisdiction afler the effective date of the amendment. 29 U.S.C. §164(c)(1)
(1970).
24. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947) (quoted in Note, supra note 21,
at 410 n.7).
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the Board's own Columbia opinion. As the excerpted language from the Conference Report indicates, a statutory exclusion was specifically rejected. The
way to an extrastatutory exemption legitimately seemed limited to institutions whose activities may properly be said not to affect commerce, a finding
specifically rejected 25 with respect to Columbia. If indeed the activities of
the institution affect commerce, ought not the employees be entitled to the
organizational and collective bargaining rights of the Act? Presumably the
rationale for the blanket nonprofit exclusion was to permit the institution
to pass labor cost savings on to the beneficiaries of its charitable purposes.
Of course the Board nowhere in its opinion explicitly stated this explanation, as well it might not. The Columbia case was hardly an attractive one
for the enunciation of the good works doctrine. One does not win much
sympathy in arguing that library employees' wages should be suppressed so
that affluent adolescents from Scarsdale might receive a less expensive Ivy
League education. Moreover, this unstated motivation is inconsistent with
section one of the Labor Act, the "Finding and Policies" clause, which states
in part:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce ...
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association . . . and employers . . . substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce ... by depressing

wage rates....

26

Hence Congress has determined as a matter of law that wage rates and
unionization vary in inverse proportion, and that unionization and the free
flow of commerce do so proportionally. If the promotion of interstate commerce is the aim of the Act, a good works exception appears a manifest
misapplication of both its letter and spirit.
All this seems to say that the Columbia good works exclusion is erroneous,
but error is relative when the norm to which it relates is mutable. The good
works exclusion may well be "right" in some sense transcending the not unquestionable norms of the Wagner Act, which from time to time have
changed and no doubt will do so again. Columbia was "wrong" in its application of the Act, which of course is necessarily "right" in this use of the
word. Moreover, it was demonstrably unfair to the ordinary employee of a
nonprofit institution to deny him rights merely because of the eleemosynary
nature of his employer. "Nonprofit" modifies the employer and not the employee. The elimination for the most part of the good works exclusion was
accomplished by both Congress and the Board within a fairly short span of
time. The statute was amended in 197427 to repeal the exemption for non25. 97 N.L.RJB. at 425 n.2. The Board found that Columbia exceeded the standard
by at least 134%. Id.

26. 29 U.S.C. §151 (1970).
27. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
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profit hospitals 2s after the reversal four years earlier in Cornell University29
of the blanket charitable exclusion of Columbia.
After Cornell the Board seemed to temporize, especially when faced with
miniscule charitable operations so far removed from the business and industrial world and the huge nonprofit universities which operate within it.
It sought to divide nonprofit charities into two categories. Although it was
difficult to locate the great divide, the peaks and valleys were easily discernible. The peak was Cornell University,0 the multiversity or megaversity
(accepted educational neologisms),31 having annual expenditures of over 140
million and some 8,000 employees. The valley was Ming Quong Children's
Center,32 an orphanage having an income of about $530,000, largely a government subvention. In Ming Quong, the Board indicated that exclusion was
again the rule and that Cornell-type coverage would remain reserved for
nonprofit organizations having a massive impact on commerce similar to that
of large private universities:
Upon further reflection, therefore, we have concluded that we
erroneously departed, in Children's Villaget3] and Jewish Orphan's
Home34 from our congressionally approved general practice of declining jurisdiction over nonprofit charitable organizations without having
had the special kind of justification relied upon in Cornell. Applying
the Frankfurterian philosophy to which we have had previous occasion
to refer that "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to
reject it merely because it comes late," we recognize the error in this
departure from previous practices and shall act to correct it herein. 2
Nonetheless, within two years the worthy purpose as a means to exclusion
from employer coverage became a museum piece. In St. Aloysius Home,36
the Board majority abolished any distinction in assertion of jurisdiction based
upon profit, using as its justification for overruling such a recent case as
Ming Quong the 1974 removal by Congress of the only statutory nonprofit

28. Current §2(2) now reads exactly as before, but with the hospital clause deleted.
See 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (Supp. 1974).
29. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
30. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Gee, supra note 3, at 240; McHugh, Collective Bargaining with Professionals in Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determination, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 55, 64.
McHugh says that the "term [megaversity] would apply to large and complex multicampus
institutions." McHugh, supra at 64 n.51. A megaversity is to be distinguished from a
university, the latter being the same as a multiversity, whatever that may be.
32. 210 N.L.R.B. 899 (1974), overruled, St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 92
L.R.R.M. 1355 (1976).
33. 186 N.L.R.B. 953 (1970).
34. 191 N.L.R.B. 32 (1971).
35. 210 N.L.R.B. at 900-01 (footnotes omitted). The oscillation in the Board's position
on charitable institutions is described in Serritella, The National Labor Relations Board
and Nonprofit Charitable,Educational and Religious Institutions, 21 CATH. LAW. 322 (1975).
36. 224 N.L.R.B. No. 70. 92 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1976). The Board applied its jurisdictional
standards developed for profitmaking child care institutions in Salt & Pepper Nursery School
& Kindergarten, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 202, 91 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1976). 92 L.R.R.M. at 1357 n.6.
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exemption from the Act.3 The dissenters correctly observed that the legislative change, which was surgically precise in excising only the blanket exemption for health-care institutions, in no way affected the Board's administra38
tive discretion as expressed in Ming Quong.
The Board is clearly ill at ease in the nonprofit area. It was difficult
enough to determine whether all or some nonprofit employers belonged
within its sphere of regulation. But once that question is decided, the problem does not disappear. The Board has yet to deal with the harder part.
When it drew nonprofit employers within its circle, it sucked in most of
their employees as well, some of whom arguably do not belong there. One
should not chide too severely, for the Act which the Board is charged to
administer carries a broad definition of "employee," with only one meaningful exclusion, one that is not at all tailored to the university or law faculty:
"The term 'employee' shall include any employee . . . but shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor."' 9 This is the canker
that gnaws: given a covered institution and a statute written in the black
and white of industrial hierarchicalism, how can one accommodate the
special needs of an educational collegium?
The Unit Appropriatefor Bargaining
Having decided that a university is covered by the Act and meets the
administrative standards for the obtention of jurisdiction, the National Labor
Relations Board is faced with a crucial and subtle task:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof.40
In deciding university bargaining unit questions - the so-called unit determination- the Board initially drew upon its thirty-five years of experience
in the industrial setting, although acknowledging the novelty of the case
before it. It stated the controlling considerations in universal terms in the
case involving Cornell:
In determining whether a particular group of employees constitutes an
appropriate unit for bargaining where an employer operates a number
of facilities, the Board considers such factors as prior bargaining history,
centralization of management particularly in regard to labor relations,
extent of employee interchange, degree of interdependence or autonomy
of the plants, differences or similarities in skills and functions of the
employees, and geographical location of the facilities in relation to each
other. We are mindful that we are entering into a hitherto uncharted
area. Nevertheless, we regard the above principles as reliable guides
37. 92 L.R.R.M. at 1356-57.
38. Id. at 1358-60 (Murphy, Chairman, & Penello, Member, dissenting).

39. 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1970).
40. Id. §159(b).
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to organization in the educational context as they have been in the
industrial, and will apply them to the circumstances of the instant
case. 41
Borrowings of industrial criteria are not inappropriate for some unit
questions. 42 Thus, the Board's known predilection for large, system-wide
units in industry has been carried over without undue violence to multicampus institutions. 43 In questions more directly affecting which persons on
a given campus shall be in the unit, however, the treatments are more suspect.
The difficulties arise from the inadequacy of traditional labor policies to deal
effectively with shared authority.
Several more specific questions require attention before the unit may be
defined for a university faculty: (1) Who are the supervisors who must be
excluded from the unit under the Act? (2) Are part-time faculty members
or adjuncts to be placed in the unit, and what is to be done with satellite
personnel, such as administrators and librarians or research fellows? (3) Should
separate units be carved out for schools or departments such as law, medicine,
or engineering?
Supervisors: Faculty Members in General. The National Labor Relations
Act excludes from the definition of "employee ' ' 44 "any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, .

.

. promote, dis-

charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action." 45 There is an argument to be made that most faculty members fit
this statutory definition because they continually and individually exercise
these powers over graduate teaching assistants, private research assistants,
and faculty secretaries. Such a reading of the supervisory exclusion would
effectively prevent organization among professionals, as it is a normal concomitant of professional activity to supervise associated nonprofessional per46
sonnel. The Labor Act contains, however, specific provisions regulating
professional organization. Hence a harmonization between the two conflicting
sections is required. The Board has routinely held that incidental supervision
of nonprofessional employees by professionals in a university does not exclude the professional as a supervisor 4 7 although as one commentator has
41. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 336.
42. For a general review of academic unit determination, see Pollitt & Thompson,
Collective Bargaining on the Campus: A Survey Five Years After Cornell, 1 INDUS. REL.

L.J. 191, 206-38 (1976). Specific problems of faculty (rather than academic) units are
addressed by Gee, supra note 3, at 249-54, and Moore, The Determination of Bargaining
Units for College Faculties, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 43 (1975).

43. See Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 673 (1973); Duke Univ., 200 N.L.R.B.
81 (1972); Tulane Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 329 (1972).
44. 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1970).
45. Id. §152(11).
46. Id. §§152(12), 159(b)(1).
47. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 644 (1972) ("an employee whose principal
duties are of the same character as that of other bargaining unit employees should not
be isolated from them solely because of a sporadic exercise of supervisory authority over
nonunit personnel"); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), overruled on other grounds,
Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1973); C. W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189
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observed, the Board is more consistent in the application of the rule with
faculty members than with other university professionals such as librarians. 48
A more subtle interpretation of "supervisor" would exclude faculty
members who exercise the statutory functions over peers. The argument has
been made on two levels: first, that all faculty members engage in supervisory
or managerial activities49 in the initiation of and varying degrees of control
over faculty personnel policies such as recruitment, appointment, reappointment, promotion, tenure, removal, and even remuneration. The more narrow
assertion is that certain faculty members should be excluded by virtue of their
membership in bodies exercising supervisory powers which concededly meet
the statutory norms.50 The Board has rejected both approaches. Its opinions
merit attention, for they do what labor law was created to prevent; the
opinions interpret facts to conform to extant dogma rather than conform
doctrine to the industrial realities in play.
In the first post-Cornell faculty case to reach the Board, C.W. Post Center
of Long Island University,51 the Board rejected the notion that all faculty
members must be excluded under the language of the Act with the following
comment:
Mindful that we are to some extent entering into an unchartered
area, we are of the view that the policymaking and quasi-supervisory
authority which adheres to full-time faculty status but is exercised by
them only as a group does not make them supervisors ....52
As one commentator has aptly observed, "[t]he answer above was for another
question.... The argument pursued by the employer in that case was that
all faculty were supervisors and managerial employees."53 That a given group
of employees - the paradigm of a board of directors or a management council,
for instance - exercises supervisory authority as a group is patently irrelevant.
Nonetheless, the Board adhered to this questionable distinction in three later
cases, Fordham University,54 Manhattan College,55 and University of Miami.56
The analysis in the last case is telling:
At the University of Miami, faculty participation in collegial decisionmaking is on a collective rather than individual basis, it is exercised in
N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). The qualifier "sporadic" seems questionable. The most complete
discussion, noting the Board's inconsistencies, is in Kahn, supra note 17, at 129-35.
48. See Kahn, supra note 17, at 130-31.
49. The argument was propounded, and rejected, in the first university faculty unit
case to reach the Board. See C. W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904,
905-06 (1971).
50. See Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639
(1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), overruled on other grounds, Seton Hill
College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1973).
51. 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
52. Id. at 905.
53. Moore, supra note 40, at 54-55.
54. 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
55. 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972).
56. 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
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the faculty's own interest rather than "in the interest of the
employer."
[sic] and final authority rests with the board of trustees.51
This is odd language indeed. That final authority rests elsewhere is, juridically speaking, a commonplace as to all but corporate directors and has
never been of more than remote interest in connection with supervisory
status. The very language of the Act quoted above negates any inference that
final authority or anything approaching it need be vested in an employee to
make him a supervisor; even recommendatory power suffices. Equally curious
is the Board's observation that the faculty in its collective decisionmaking
acts not "in the interest of the employer" but in its own interest. It is
difficult to conceive precisely what this signifies. In whose interest is the hiring
of a new professor, the decision to drop two courses with small enrollments,
or the selection of a dean or department chairman? To paraphrase Wittgenstein, why ask questions which yield only unsatisfactory answers? The obvious
difficulty is in asking the question whether an action is in the interest of
the employer or the employee. A polarity demands a polarity. Under a system
of shared authority all but the most narrowly oriented decisions inure to the
benefit (or detriment) of that network of relationships which we commonly
recognize as a university. Whence the paradox: under the Board's view, concededly supervisory functions-5 are nonetheless not in the interest of the
employer.5 9 By forcing newly found facts into the ready receptacles of preexisting doctrine the Board has developed an absurdity.
In this manner the Board has disposed of the broad contention that all
faculty members are by function supervisors. The narrower, and by virtue of
that narrowness, more orthodox, attempt to exclude individual faculty
members serving on influential personnel and policy committees or in a
powerful university senate was likewise unavailing. Noting catchingly that
"these faculty bodies . . . are not quite either fish or fowl," 6

the Board

lumped the committeemen with the employees rather than with the supervisors on the now familiar ground that collective exercise of supervisory
authority is not determinative under section 2(11). 61 The decision is placed in
perspective by a writer who, while sympathetic to the Board's quandry, is
critical of its solution:
The Board's inability to recognize the real exercise of supervisory
authority is understandable. On most campuses, the exercise of
authority is a fluid process
beyond the ken of all but the most ener62
getic professor-politicians.

57. Id. at 634 (footnote omitted).
58. See C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
59. See University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
60. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972).
61. Id. See also Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193
N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), overruled on other grounds, Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026

(1973).
62. Moore, supra note 40, at 55.
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She notes that inclusion or exclusion of this or that committee potentate is
unlikely to affect the outcome of the election, "but it may be important in
the functioning of a contract which either incorporates or, alternatively,
ignores that committee."6' 3 In other words, the fear is polarization, but she
accepts it with resignation: "Unfortunately, labor relations frequently force
6' 4
a person onto one side of the table or the other."
This I find unwarranted. Labor law should accommodate if possible,
constrain only if it must. Specifically because it is difficult to locate the
sides of the table across which university decisions are reached, it is wrong
to tag this group as permanent protagonist and that one as constant antagonist.
The labels do not fit well, and assigning them insensitively only mutilates the
system of shared authority, which has served us, if not perfectly, passably
well. 6 5
Supervisors: Deans and Department Chairmen. The Board's treatment of
department heads has been termed "wholly inconsistent."66 Nonetheless, if
indeed it exists here, inconsistency is itself not so great a cause for disturbance as the lack of understanding of university governance of which it
is the symptom. What to do with heads of departments in higher education
is but a shade down the spectrum from the general faculty question. The
neat, stark contrast between the supervisor and the supervised found in
industry is hardly the norm here. Unusually troublesome is the phenomenon
that the "supervised" exercise substantial control over the titular supervisors. Regrettably, the Labor Act does not admit of this subtlety, but
assumes that one must either supervise or be supervised. Having drawn the
chalkline, however, the Board has yet to determine decisively who shall stand
on which side. Again, its first pronouncement came in C.W. Post Center,
which, in addressing the more easily definable role of college deans, set the
trend by treating these faculty members as essentially administrators and,
therefore, excluded supervisors. With this one does not quibble, for the
college dean overseeing a multitude of disciplines and undertakings has in
most instances abandoned pro tempore his didactic functions and assumed
primary duties that are within the full spirit of the Act's definition of
67

"supervisor."

The department chairman is different and shares this difference with
those anointed few who claim the title of dean but hold sway only within

an identifiable discipline, usually a professional one such as law, medicine,
music, journalism, engineering, or nursing. That these individuals fit gracefully into neither the taxon of supervisor nor that of employee is clear from
the disarray in the case law. They are excluded; they are included. This is
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Indeed, as Moore has observed, the committee system and its apotheosis, the
faculty or university senate, may be illegal under the Wagner Act. One must treat with
the union. See Moore, supra note 40, at 56 n.48 (citing Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639

(1972)).
66.
67.

Kahn, supranote 17, at 135.
See also University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634

(1974); Tusculum College, 199

N.L.R.B. 28 (1972).
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by itself no criticism, for case-by-case analysis is especially appropriate in
labor law. The Board's decisions 68 display a relatively fine touch:
[I]f the departmental chairmen are no more than first among equals,
selected by their colleagues to represent the faculty interests in negotiations with the administration, the NLRB holds them to be properly
included within the faculty bargaining unit. On the other hand, if
they are appointed by the administration to supervise the department
as the administration sees best, then they are excluded from the
faculty bargaining unit. When they are neither completely one nor the
other, a balancing process takes place to determine whether their
interests are closer to those of the faculty or the administration. 9
Indeed the department chairman and school dean are more likely to have
interests much closer to the faculty from which they came and to which
they normally will return. I do not think it hyperbole to suggest the usual
law school dean or physics chairman would be aghast to be told he belongs
"over there" in the administration or that his interests are not primarily
those of his colleagues. Unfortunately, that is not the question at hand.
"Community of interest" is the test of whether one should be placed in this
or that unit appropriate for bargaining, an area of wide Board discretion. It
is adjudicatory sleight of hand to use it with reference to the specific statutory
exclusion for supervisors, especially where "supervisor" is painstakingly defined. Of what consequence to the actual exercise of supervisory power is it
that the dean despises the chancellor and vice-president, adores his faculty
colleagues, and coauthors monographs with his assistant professors? Obviously none. The Board has done an artful job of selecting those chairmen
who are the administration's minions and placed them outside the unit
as supervisors and those who are primus inter pares, the elder statesmen who
speak for the discipline. This is not, however, what the statute commands.
The Board consciously or not is redrafting the Wagner Act, making more
and more determinations based on "community of interest," likely from the
uneasy perception that the supervisor-employee dichotomy is unworkable in
and even destructive of university relations.
Do we damn these decisions, praise them, or damn them with faint praise?
Cessante ratio legis, cessat et ipsa lex. The original purpose of the supervisory exclusion was prophylactic: an employer ought not be unnecessarily in
doubt as to the loyalty of his supervisory subalterns. Conflicts of interest
should be avoided. These considerations are inappropriate in the university
68. E.g., Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1975) (chairmen included); Rensselaer
Polytechnic Inst., 218 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1975) (chairmen excluded); Northeastern Univ., 218
N.L.R.B. 247 (1975) (chairmen included); Fordham Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 971 (1974) (chairmen included); Loretto Heights College, 205 N.L.R.B. 1134 (1973) (chairmen excluded);
Florida S. College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888 (1972) (chairmen included); C.W. Post Center of
Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971) (chairmen excluded). See also University of
Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974) (chairmen included); Rosary Hill College, 202 N.L.R.B.
1137 (1973) (chairmen included); Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972) (chairmen included) ; University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566 (1971) (chairmen included).
69. Pollitt & Thompson, supra note 40, at 231.
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of shared authority. How does one avoid the conflict -does one want to when the faculty participates in the selection of the deans and chairmen?
Can one ever assure loyalty to the administration in the unique situation
in which most supervisors affirmatively desire eventually to be returned on
cordial terms to the bosom of their scholarly peers? The problem is in the
statute. The university can well be forced into its mold by the might of
law and government. But when the mold is removed, I wonder whether we
should still regard the object as a university. Or the statute may be viewed
more as a pattern which may be shifted here and there to fit the fabric, with
a good deal of room left for innovation around the edges. To me the choice
is apparent.
Part-Time Faculty and Satellite Personnel. From what has gone before,
the solution as to part-time faculty might appear obvious. In so closely a
collegial atmosphere, with the initiation into the sanctum sanctorum of the
permanent appointment so jealously guarded, there must be cause for excluding part-time professors. More than emotion needs to undergird the law,
however. There must be a sound basis for segregating the full-time from the
part-time, especially since the Board's industrial practice has been decidedly
the opposite. Persuasive reasons do exist. If the essential quality of a university
professorship is teaching, then the interest of the Tuesday-evening man
might well approach that of the full-timer. I should not willingly, however,
concede so limited a role to the man or woman who dedicates virtually all
the productive hours of the day to the university. There is an irreducible
core of activity distinguishing the university professor from teachers generally,
a core comprising not only the pedagogy common to all teachers but also
the advancement of knowledge through prolonged research and, of critical
moment here, the government of the university. In these last two realms
the adjunct professor has little "interest" under either of the obvious meanings that the term bears. The contributions to education and the dedication
to the university of part-time educators cannot seriously be mooted, but these
are of a different quality requiring disparate treatment.
The placement of adjunct professors with respect to a general faculty
unit first arose in C.W. Post,70 in which the Board resisted the university's
argument that the former should be lodged in a separate unit, thus adhering
to its twin predilections for larger units and for putting "like" workers in
the same unit. A change in position came in New York University71 in which
the Board's majority excluded part-time faculty, using language which seems
broad enough to exclude adjunct members in most future cases:
The Board has long recognized "that mutuality of interest in wages,
hours, and working conditions is the prime determinant of whether a
given group of employees constitutes an appropriate unit." The record
in this case convinces us that there is no real mutuality of interest
between the part-time and full-time faculty at New York University
because of the difference with respect to (1) compensation, (2) participa70.
71.

189 N.L.R.B..at 905-06.
205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973).
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tion in University government, (3) eligibility for tenure, and (4) working conditions.
The part-time faculty members do not participate in the governance of the University. They are excluded from membership on both
the university senate and the faculty council. They do not participate
in departmental decisions with respect to appointment, promotion, or
tenure status. Similarly, they are not consulted with respect to curriculum development, degree requirements, selection of department chairmen, or admission requirements. In no real sense do the part-time faculty
share the responsibilities of the full-time faculty
in the development of
72
the institutional policies of the University.
This current Board practice has been praised 3 and criticized 7 4 but in view
of the limited common ground of activity between full-time and part-time
professors,7 5 the praise is more deserved.
As to so-called satellite personnel the solution is actually made more
simple by the heterogeneity of the category, which presumably includes the
whole array of support personnel somehow allied to the faculty's functions.
Because the librarian here is quite unlike the librarian there, and because a
baseball coach is not easily analogized to a guidance counselor, the Board
must consider these staff members one by one to see whether their interests
are at bottom those of the faculty members with whom they work, or whether
both sets of interests might better be served by the establishment of separate
units. This sort of case-by-case determination is the stuff of the Board's
competence, and the decisions viewed together testify to its wise exercise . 7
There are, nonetheless, some areas for correction. In general, librarians
are adjudged sufficiently close to the professional enterprise to be included
in a faculty unit,7 while other persons, no matter how worthy their en-

deavors, are seen as having interests essentially distinct.7 8 Again, we find
approval and disapproval, but the difference in the two positions centers
upon the inclusion of librarians rather than the exclusion of the others. The
supporters suggest that the unit determination should mirror prior patterns
of faculty and university governance, recognizing as faculty for unit purposes
whomever the faculty itself coopts and citing head librarians as an example. 79
72. Id. at 6-7.
73. Moore, supra note 40, at 55.
74. Pollitt & Thompson, supra note 40, at 223. The criticism is partially aimed at the
Board's per se rule, a rule the Board has never announced.
75. Adjunct law professors were specifically excluded from a law school unit in University of San Francisco, 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973). See also Catholic Univ. of America, 201
N.L.R.B. 929 (1973).
76. The decisions are catalogued in Kahn, supra note 17, at 105-09; Moore, supra note
40, at 56-58; and Pollitt & Thompson, supra note 40, at 225-38.
77. See, e.g., C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971); subsequent cases cited in Pollitt & Thompson, supra note 40, at 232 n.273.
78. The excluding cases are described and enumerated in Pollitt & Thompson, supra
note 40, at 233-44.
79. Moore, supra note 40, at 58. The author correctly noted that these head librarians
"may have to be excluded as supervisors if they spend more than fifty percent of their
time supervising." Id. at 48 n.56.
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Opponents point out a flaw more in the practice than in the theory, and
0
use University of San Franciscoto demonstrate the point. In that instance
the Board initially included in a law school unit a head librarian and two
assistant professional librarians, correctly remarking that a law library is a
completely integrated part of the normal law school. At San Francisco, none
of the law librarians was law-trained and none taught in the law school.
The two assistants were included but the head librarian was excluded, not
as a satellite but on the basis of her supervision of the two included assistants.
This turns law school governance on its head. While it is the emerging norm
for head librarians to be regarded as peers by the law faculty, assistants are
not so viewed. "To include the assistant librarians within a faculty unit, but
exclude the head librarians simply because they are supervisors is to ignore
the reality of academic life."'' I believe I can trace the genealogy of this
error, which is not to say I can change it. Faculty members are in the
unit, and the supervisory aspect of their role is thought to disappear because
the Board names it "collective." A head librarian is like a faculty member and
an assistant librarian has the same background and interests as a head
librarian, but a head librarian is a supervisor and is unfortunate enough not
to be a "collective."
If the answer is to put librarians in a separate unit, arguably reflecting
their actual role in the university, and to keep head librarians with the
faculties which accept them, one still runs into the supervisory difficulty, another reminder that the application of industrial notions of supervision are
unworkable in a nonhierarchical workplace. This is especially so in law schools,
where shared governance is carried to a fetish with the American Bar Association even mandating faculty meddling in all manner of library affairs. 8 2 The
other ghost which remains to haunt us is acknowledging the faculty's power
to decide by cooption who shall or shall not be in its unit.
Multiplication of Faculty Units. Having paid some deference to the
faculty's own perception of who belongs in its bargaining unit, the Board
faces the fragmentation dilemma common to all heterogeneous employee
groups. In the words of one observer, "[i]t opened the real Pandora's box
of faculty self-definition." 83 The question, paradigmatically put, is whether a
law professor is more lawyer or professor. The difficulty does not stop with
the law faculty just because it started there. Any discipline which has a
healthy, practicing collegial counterpart not dominated by the professoriate
will feel the centrifugal tug. Those with the economic power to do so will
be able to demand and obtain concessions from the university in the areas
of salaries, teaching loads, and other tokens of autonomy. They are at present
law, medicine, dentistry, and perhaps engineering. It is evident that the
erstwhile practitioners do not identify wholly with the profession but rather
have left it and gone over to a camp which maintains somewhat strained
80. 207 N.L.R.B. 12 (1973). See Pollitt & Thompson, supra note 40, at 233; see also
Kahn, supra note 17, at 108-09 (also critical but on the basis of the early cases).
81. Pollitt & Thompson, supra note 40, at 233.

82. See note 10 supra.
83. Moore, supra note 40, at 60.
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relations with the practice. Any law professor can tell you of the gap -real
because it is imagined - between the bar and the schools. Nor does the professional school faculty member always see himself as just another college
professor. As one respected law dean told an indignant undergraduate professor who asked why the law and medical faculties should have two pay
raises to his one: "Because we can get jobs elsewhere." Crude, but informative.
Faced with the ambiguous position of graduate professional schools in
the university world, should the Board deny separate representation and
foster heteronomy, or sever the lawyers and affirm their autonomy? In Syracuse University,84 it chose the latter course:
Relatively small in number, oriented more closely to their chosen field
than to the academic or university world, with intellectual interests
more nearly aligned with those of their brethren in practice than with
their academic colleagues of the faculty, it is apparent that their special
interests may suffer if not recognized. The same is undoubtedly true
of other disciplines, most particularly those requiring work at the
graduate level to prepare for specialized areas of endeavor - as opposed
to purely scholarly or intellectual pursuits. Such disciplines, more
practical than intellectual, identifiable - we anticipate - by the relationship between their academic and practicing colleagues, are, at once,
part of the academic world and foreign to it and to each other.35
This finding makes me uneasy. In some ways it is demonstrably false while
in others true, if vague. 'It is the law professor's very commitment to the
scholarly or intellectual pursuits which estranges him from his brethren
in practice and pushes him into the arms of his academic colleagues. That he
is different in certain accidents does not imply that he is different in essence.
Remove his salary bonus and his natural clannishness and he is a university
professor, itself a genus, not a species. The much discussed distinctiveness of
law professors is overexaggerated and underanalyzed. The isolation of the
law faculty is no greater.-just more obvious for its fairly unique singlediscipline building and other perquisites and baubles- than that of other
departments which fall on this side or that of traditional divisions. I have
always noticed that while the lawyers mix with the philosophers, the men
of letters, and economists, and even with the psychologists and sociologists,
all of these have a difficult time of breaching the wall of the physical sciences,
if indeed they try.
Edward Levi, who possesses the purest of credentials on both sides of the
issue, is inclined to doubt the uniqueness of legal educators. His thoughts
are worthy of extended quotation:
[T]he modern law school within a university community finds its
position considerably altered. The law school as a graduate area is no
longer particularly unique by virtue of its post-undergraduate status.
There are many graduate areas, and graduate work is the assumed
84.

204 N.L.R.B. 641 (1973).

85.

Id. at 643-44.
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objective of a large proportion of undergraduate students. . . . But
what this says, and we all know it, is that some of the uniqueness of
the law school by virtue of its post-graduate study, and the uniqueness
of the bar itself, are diminishing. Lawyers after all were first important - and this was a long time ago - because they could read and
write, not in the way law school deans now say they should, but barely.
Now many people can read and write in the same way. Then they
were unique because they were the undoubted leaders in the community. They are still among the leaders, but there are many professions which in some sense have taken over. Business itself has become a
profession, and is gaining strong professional and well-supported
schools. The lawyer now finds himself advising clients in industry
who have had more schooling than he has had and who have been
back for more high-level refresher courses than are available in the
law school world. Law schools are not unique either, to the extent that
through their Association or otherwise they demand special recognition
of their separatism, as, for example, on such an important matter that
the law library be autonomous....
Every area of the university is apt to demand the same kind of
recognition in the flurry of centrifugal forces which have overtaken
the modem institution of learning. What may be unique is that the law
schools have relatively less financial means to go it alone than some of
the other areas. Law schools do not get large federal financial grants,
and the day when law schools could operate as large tuition-receiving
institutions is probably vanishing. Even the competition of the Bar
may not be the help to law school faculty salaries in that unique sense
which may have been assumed. There is a lot of competition for
physicists, mathematicians, economists, and, perhaps because of the
speeches of law school deans, even English professors. I fear I am now
distorting what should be the merit of the inner spirit and cultural
values with somewhat crass material considerations. But if universities
are to be divided up for the benefit of those areas which bring the
political power, I doubt the law
most money or have the greatest
86
schools will fare very well.
There seems to me no benefit to division for division's sake, as if universities will have any shortage of bargaining units. Examining the unit for
the purpose it serves in the statutory scheme, as the employee grouping
most appropriate for negotiating contracts concerning the terms and conditions of employment, yields the discovery that a university-wide faculty
unit is, literally, appropriate. The wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment are generally now handled on a campus-wide level. More often
than not, retirement, insurance, and other fringe benefits are a function of
faculty status and not of membership in a particular school or discipline. If
representation will inexorably damage distinctive minority interests worthy
of protection, an autonomous unit should be created. But this severance or
fragmentation should not casually be allowed, for it creates divisions where
there had been but differences, administrative nightmares where there had
been only inconveniences, and puts an educational conglomerate of divisions
and departments where once there had been a university.

86. Levi, supra note 2, at 246-47.
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CONCLUSION

The courts of the United States were ousted for the most part from
the regulation of American labor relations, first by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
in 1932, and in 1935 by the Wagner Act, because they could not formulate
a cohesive approach to the newly appeared mass industrial unionism. In
retrospect we do not view these common law judges as nasty capitalists, heels
upon the neck of organized labor, but merely as failures. We do not hesitate
to speculate, nonetheless, that their individual backgrounds and more importantly, the cumbersome and unyielding tradition of the institutions they
administered led them to their failures. They were white-collar arbiters in
blue-collar disputes.
The National Labor Relations Board is facing a not dissimilar problem in
seeking to apply its store of experience to faculty bargaining, and to date it
is not performing well. Like the judges at the turn of this century, the
Board members administer a law which is inflexible in its own way. The
Act's history and its application are both essentially narrow and dated. The
statute creaks along on provisions not designed to bear the weight now
put upon them. Like their predecessor judges, the Board members do their
best, but "best" is not a synonym for "good." They are acting like blue-collar
bosses in white-collar affairs. They are following (in good faith, it is true) the
blueprint of the Wagner Act, but that was drawn for other purposes altogether.
Until we find a scheme of labor regulation which recognizes the structural
uniqueness of the university of shared authority, the results can only be
unsatisfactory.
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